"Well: I was trained as Magyar. I firmly believed that my confession is only Jewish, but I am ethnic Magyar. Since, however, I am not a faithful Israelite, I have no community with the Jewry. Then I became cosmopolitan at the university. All this was a mistake and lie!" 1 The kind of mixed identity thus expressed by Aladár Komlós in 1921 characterized many Hungarian Jews at around the beginning of the twentieth century. Before the mid-nineteenth century, however, the label Jew simply meant that someone belonged to the Israelite denomination. In the aftermath of Jewish emancipation this changed fundamentally. Although few converted and/or contracted a mixed marriage (which also demanded apostasy prior to 1895), 2 after 1868 the label 'Jewish' was applied not only to the members of the Israelite denomination. Since it might even have happened that an individual was born into a Jewish family, was baptized as an infant or a child, received a Christian (Catholic or Protestant) education, and he or she was not even aware of his/her Jewish origin. This is the reason why historians prefer to use the term, of Jewish origin instead of the word, Jew.
3
But that is not the whole story. Following 1868, due to the split of the Israelite Church into Neológ and Orthodox (and even status quo ante) parishes, adherence to the Israelite Church came less and less to express the real self-consciousness of an incessantly growing number of Hungarian Jews. Social history studies have clearly demonstrated the great difference between a Neológ and an Orthodox Jew, both in their social advance and their degree of assimilation. As opposed to the urban Neologs, Orthodox Jews, who made up about half of Jewry around 1910, showed little or no evidence of embourgeoisement, modernity, economic and intellectual innovation. There is hardly any doubt that in itself Jewish religious status did not invest Jewry with a "special group susceptibility", which caused the development of an "achievement ethics and work morale rare in Hungary" -as Karády regularly holds. 4 As regards ethnicity, especially if we use the criterion of mother tongue, a major part of the Jews (with the exception of some Orthodox elements) has succesfully been assimilated into the Hungarian nation. Still, in spite of their rapid and massive cultural assimilation (acculturation), the Jews as a whole still retained some sort of otherness well into the twentieth century. The resurgent political anti-Semitism of the post-war years occasionally defined it as racial separation, and tied it at the beginning (in the 1920s) to denominational criteria; later, especially after 1941, at the time of the anti-Jewish laws, it kept track of the Jews by heredity, in line with the Nazi notion of race. The ethnic difference of the Jews cannot signify that they constitute a national minority; 5 they were never given such status, and they never claimed it. Moreover, the Jews cannot be described as a group with an unassimilated language. There was only one reason why they preserved some of their distinct status in the interwar period; namely that they were victims of pronounced political and social discrimination.
***
What then is the reason for the uninterrupted anti-Semitism in spite of the many apparent signs of a successful integration of the Jews? (Integration is meant here as assimilation since along the norms dictating the building of nation-states in the "long nineteenth century", integration has not yet gained ground in a fuller sense.) One possible reason could be what Saul Friedländer has also stressed in his book on German anti-Semitism that although anti-Semitism always implies a pre-exist-ing hostile attitude or disposition, still the Jews in spite all of their efforts remain a distinct group as being easily or more or less recognizable by the most various criteria. 6 This can also be justified in Hungary's case. Karády's statistically based research findings have abundantly demonstrated that after acculturation, Magyarization of names, rather than religious conversion, was the method most generally chosen for a shift of identity. It indicates that the more loosely a given attribute was linked to denominational identity, the easier it was to break away from it in the interests of adaptation. Hence, following only slight initial resistance, very large numbers of those assimilating gave up Yiddish, and, as a second step, changed their names.
Thus little evidence seems to support the thesis of overfulfilling the assimilation norm, a doctrine advanced by several scholars (including Karády).
7 As has already been mentioned, Jewishness based on identification with a particular confessional status, does not represent the authentic (Jewish) identity. Milton M. Gordon called marital assimilation (the mixed-or intermarriage) as "keystone of the arch of assimilation". 8 In applying the notion of "inter-confessional" mixed marriage not exclusively to the ones contracted between the Jews and the Christians, but even to those contracted among the Jews themselves, it can be discerned that the more the Neologs were assimilated, the more the Orthodox Jews were ready to separate themselves from the "sinners of Israel" as they called their Jewish counterparts. Quantitative evidence is now available to show the infrequency of such "intermarriages" between Neológ and Orthodox Jews. The separation observed in that regard was so extreme that, as Jakov Katz has contended, in the life of the third generation, born in the 1900s, "the Neológ and Orthodox Jews functioned even as two distinct social entities".
9
Successful integration on the one side was thus plainly opposed by the increasing mutual alienation among the Jews on the other side. The process discussed finally led to two important consequences. First, the Jews who persistently insisted on their traditionally defined religious identity, met several insurmountable barriers in their assimilation, if willing at all to be assimilated. This went hand in hand with their unfavourable social status and immobility. Most of them lived in villages, pursued lower paid occupations not carrying high prestige, and in consequence remained more or less strangers in their own local communities, which were dominated mainly by agrarian populations.
As a piece of evidence one may cite the observation of an anthropologist, who has described the relationships between the Jews and the peasants in a Transdanubian village.
The Jewry of Aba, by virtue of his ethnic and economic character, differed from the rural society. Notwithstanding the fact that the Jews were already emancipated due to the intense symbolic contacts held in everyday life, not even their two hundred-year presence in the local community resulted in a complete identification in the values and the way of life, not yet with the bourgeois stratum. In terms of the latter, they remained a caste, and as such were prevented from amalgamation by religious taboos. These sanctions, chiefly the religious endogamy made impossible for the Christians, first of all the peasants (who wanted more to approach the Jews) to accommodate them unconditionally.
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Second, not only assimilation, but even internal Jewish integrity was at the stake in this process. Social stratification played a great role in choosing this or that path even including several Orthodox Jews. A representative of the latter recalls from the interwar Szombathely the following way: "many refused to come to my Bar Micva holiday since I was pupil of a lay school (polgári iskola). It was forgiven for the rich Eiland children that they studied at the grammar school (gimnázium), but not for me, the poor".
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The true identity of many Jewish people can only be discerned by microscopic investigation of daily social practice. So it is no wonder that everyday perception and particularly the anti-Semitic representation of the other took mostly into account not the individual identity but the group image inherited from the not too distant past. This, in addition, was further supported by some evident social facts.
The social indicators of modernity -Karády also admits -clearly divide Hungarian Jewry into two major sectors, which broadly correspond to the Orthodox-Neolog division. Still, the main conclusion of this investigation ... should stress the importance of secondary divisions cutting across the Neolog-Orthodox divide.
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The secondary-division, or more plainly, the still existing Jewish unity also manifested itself, to cite one example only, in the discourse on philanthropy and altruism. Both the Neológ and the Orthodox discourse aimed to establish an intrinsic connection between charity and the authentic Jewish "soul", by interpreting philanthropy as one to come from true generosity rather than social obligation only. True, however, that the Neologs alone were to emphasize the inter-denominational character of Jewish charity to counter the blames of an uninterrupted "Jewish solidarity". 13 And this was even a real practice as evidenced by the average case of the legacy of Izsák Tafler, a wealthy Budapest wholesale merchant and house-holder, who died in 1891. Tafler, to match the expectations known in the Israelite Church, allotted a large sum to charitable ends; apart from the money provided for some poor members of his family, forty per cent of the sum went to the poor of Budapest (without any denominational specification) and fifty-six per cent was given to various Jewish institutions (hospital and the Chevra Cadisha).
14 Assimilation shaped by these and the similarly contradictory circumstances, also covered the growing divergence between the identity of many Jews and the widely held image usually attached to Jewishness. This resulted in an ambivalent mental state of all those who were deeply involved in the assimilation process. That is the reason why one may question any "essentiahzing" understanding of contemporary Jewishness. The obvious temptation to adopt an essentialist view is based on two reasons. First, it has a lot to do with the essentialist thinking, which unanimously dominated the minds of contemporaries. They in their "drive to uni formity" tended to fully match the expectations that they were exposed to in the course of nation-state building. So, it is not wholly an accident that due to "the in creasing power of the discourse [ofthat kind], Jews too, willy-nilly, became en meshed in its logic, forced to conduct the dialogue within this essentialist frame work". 15 In truth, Aladár Komlós, who publicly confessed his double commitment and flexible identity was more of an exception than a rule. 16 Second, the historical sources historians are regularly working with, notably statistics (census data in particular) strongly suggest or even prescribe the essentiahzing reduction of Jewish identity. This is because statistics are an inevi table part of the national discourse aiming at furthering homogenization rather than reflecting the growing fragmentation and diversity of group self-conscious-17 ness.
I am ready to break away from this essentialist notion of historical Jewry, a doctrine which also took the form of historicist integrationism (an approach that was aptly criticized by András Gerő some years ago).
18 Instead, I would adopt the co-constitutive approach in terms both of assimilation and nationalism. "Co-con stitutionality" means that group identities are not seen as fixed social entities, but "as negotiated constructions in which, at critical points, the role of the Jews (whether or not identified as such) is conceived not simply as contributory but well-nigh co-constitutive." Accepting the position that Steven E. Aschheim takes on the issue, I would also emphasize the fact that such complex cultures and iden tities like the Jewish one to be found in Hungary at that time are always contextually and interactively constructed.
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The conceptual framework advocated here makes the distinction between iden tity and image an important issue. The much quoted facts or events like (1) the sharpening competition of professionals in the labour market, or (2) the large in fluence exerted by the new Galician immigration during the war, or (3) the nega tive repercussion of the swift emergence of war millionaires (with many Jews among them), and (4) the drastic change concerning the political elite during the late 1910s (in 1918 and in 1919) seem not to explain in themselves the resurgent tide of extreme anti-Semitism following through the Dual Monarchy. The prob lem of how the mechanism of modern political anti-Semitic sentiment actually worked could most easily be approached through the example of 1918 and espe cially 1919, the memory of which became one of the reference points of Jewish discrimination policy and ideology in the interwar period. The vital issue arising at that point concerns the exact nature of the relationship between identity and image in terms of the left-wing intellectuals and short-lived politicians, who have always been blamed for their alleged Jewishness. As regarding Béla Kun (and his comrades) there seems to be a widely shared consensus among historians that he did not give the least manifest sign of a distinct Jewish consciousness. ' And this behavior appears to be wholly in accordance with his family socialization. Kun's father was a village notary, who later worked as clerical worker in Kolozsvár. In addition, Béla Kun was pupil of the well-known Kolozsvár Protestant College and was in his youth filled with some sense of national patriotism. Due to the close and continuous commitment to the working class movement thereafter, he also became immunized from any direct influence of Jewishness, which would have been mediated mainly by the Israelite religion and church.
Or an other case in point is Oscar Jászi, a prominent politician of the Károlyi government in 1918 and one of the leaders of the radical democrats of the early twentieth century. Jászi was also branded in the interwar period as representative of a specific Jewish spirit. As opposed to this judgement, György Litván argues in his recently published Jászi biography, "Similarly to many other assimilationists and Christianized Jewish contemporaries of him [Jászi was baptized even as a child] he also grew up and behaved in a manner for long as if he would have been born a Calvinist Magyar. Calvinism meant for him more a habitus than a religion, as he had never had a close link to the latter; and apart from his free thinking youth, he always retained a faith in God until he died." 23 And this is justified even by Jászi's well-known critical attitude both towards the assimilationist Jews and figures such as Béla Kun, an issue that has frequently been discussed by historians.
24
*** latter due to the circumstances of co-constitutionality seems not to be able to produce sharp group contours and easily identifiable social meaning. This is the starting point for a postmodern notion of identity proposed here. 25 If we look closely at the incessantly changing role that identity and image have fulfilled in the various societal processes, the doctrine assuming continuity in the development of modern political anti-Semitism from the late nineteenth century on, cannot be accepted at face value. Shulamit Volkov is right in asserting that the anti-Semitism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has no close tie to such later developments as the Nazi type anti-Semitic ideology and politics.' 6 A rigorously contextual approach is advocated by her with the aim to have a much better understanding of the peculiar nature of twentieth-century anti-Semitism. Volkov has also stated that the pre-1914 German anti-Semitism and the Nazi one was linked together only through the mental construction of a cultural code. It signifies that everybody belongs to one particular cultural camp or universe. The cognitive process expressed by this term provides the most fertile basis for the precise assessment of the kind of anti-Semitic ideology and political practice resulting in the Final Solution. However, the old anti-Semitic political parties, movements and social associations cannot be seen as merely anticipating the Nazi type anti-Semi-
The problem is also familiar in Hungary. Miklós Szabó who pioneered such scholarship in applying the term "neo-conservatism" to identify the social bases and the ideological content of pre-fascist tendencies of the turn of the century, also suggested a very similar continuity between various forms of anti-Semitisms.
2 In reconstructing the social movements (taking the form of social associations), which could mobilize large segments of the state and administrative salaried classes, the so called Christian middle class, Szabó postulated close relationship between the pre-1918 anti-Semitic movements (their organizations) and the ones appearing after the collapse of the Commune in the process of establishing the counter-revolutionary regime.
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There is no room for an exhausting critique of this argument. Instead, I want to return for a moment first to Volkov's concept of pre-Nazi anti-Semitism, and second to the paradigm of the scapegoat seeking political anti-Semitism already mentioned in connection with Béla Kun and Oscar Jászi. The function of the turnof-the-century anti-Semitism fed by a cultural code was plainly to negate even the mere possibility of Jewish emancipation (and assimilation) as declaring the absolute Jewish cultural alienness, one which cannot be eliminated. The preoccupation with the essentialist understanding of the Jew in that case was entirely tailored to the traditional image of immigrant Jewry. This special sort of perception of the Jew, however, failed then to dictate the (also essentialist) nationalist discourse amidst the co-constitutionality so much characterizing the age of emancipation and assimilation.
The case suddenly changed during the late 1910s and especially following 1918 and 1919. Anti-Semitism from that time on started to play a key role in the nationalist discourse due in part to the expansion of ethnic nationalism influenc ing the whole of Europe (not exclusively Central-Europe) at that time. 30 The spe cific contribution of Central Europe to the creation of a new form of anti-Semitism was to fill the Jewish image with a clear-cut political content. It "turned out" that the Jew, who up to this point was viewed only as a culturally alien element, might even mean a political "threat" to the host society. This was the most important message of 1918 and 1919 in the eyes of all those who were frightened by the events. 31 It is true that the language adopted by interwar anti-Semitism, retained some links with the pre-existing forms of hating Jews. However, more radical manifestations and entirely new meanings were then added to the traditionally known political anti-Semitism. These in taking the form of a political code were able in themselves to justify the anti-Jewish discrimination policy, which showed total neglect or even insensitivity to the authentic (although ambivalent) identity of many Jews. The great force of the new sense then attributed to nationalism and the irony hidden at the depth of the tragic story of Hungary's Jewry have clearly been evidenced by the fact that the most obvious (and irreversible) divergence be tween identity and image happened at a moment when the most assimilated and the least Jewish Jews lived in Hungary, namely in the period after Trianon. Karády, op. cit., 91. 5 This argument goes against Erényi's contention according to which the Jews were not only a religion but also a specific ethnic group constituting a part of the Hungarians. Erényi, op. cit 
